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Google is watching you!Introduction
Anonymity in Web Transactions
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...of course, but also...Introduction
Data Conﬁdentiality
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...of course, but also...
deduce high input from low output, in the fashion of information ﬂowAims at obfuscating the link between private input 
(anonymous actions)  and public (observable) output
Attacker tries to infer the hidden info from his 
observation of the protocol
Introduction
Anonymity Protocols (in general)This presentation
 Trust in the Crowds anonymity protocol
 Extend the Crowds protocol to a scenario where:
 Each principal may suddenly become corrupt.
 Principal behaviour is inﬂuenced by a trust relationship.
 Work:
 Study the impact of these assumptions on the protocol.
 Establish necessary and sufﬁcient criteria for choosing a 
policy able to achieve a desired level of privacy.Crowds
The protocol
Crowds [Reiter and Rubin 1998]: allows internet users to 
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“A sender is probably innocent if, from the attacker's 
point of view, the sender appears no more likely to be 
the originator than to not be the originator”Probable Innocence
Formal deﬁnition
Members: m members participating in the protocol
n honest members
c=(m-n) corrupt members or collaborating attackers
Anonymous events: a random variable A distributed over                                  
{a1, a2 …, an}, where ai indicates that the honest user i is 
the initiator of the message.
Observable events: a random variable O distributed over                                      
{o1, o2 …, on}, where oi indicates that user i is honest and 
forwards the message to a corrupted user. In this case 
we say that user i is detected. Deﬁnition [Reiter and Ruben, 98]: 
a protocol satisﬁes probable innocence if
∀i p(oi | ai) ≤ 1/2
Probable Innocence
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Formal deﬁnition
∀i  p(ai | oi)  ≤ 1/2
Deﬁnition [Halpern and O’Neill, 05]:Deﬁnition [Reiter and Ruben, 98]: 
a protocol satisﬁes probable innocence if
∀i p(oi | ai) ≤ 1/2
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∀i  p(ai | oi)  ≤ 1/2




Proposition: if the a priori distribution is uniform then
∀i p(oi | ai) = p(ai | oi) 
Proof: by Bayes theorem we have
p(oj | ai)p(ai) = p(ai | oj)p(oj)
If A is uniformly distributed then (in Crowds) O is 
uniformly distributed too. Hence p(ai) = p(oj) = 1/nProbable Innocence
Extended
Deﬁnition: 
a protocol satisﬁes α-probable innocence (0≤ α ≤ 1) if
∀i p(ai | oi) ≤ α
Proposition: 
a protocol satisﬁes α-probable innocence if and only if
1 + n(1-α)/pf ≤ mOverview
 Trust in Crowds
 Extend the Crowds protocol to a more realistic scenario:
 Associate to each principal i a probability1- ti ∈ [0,1] to 
become corrupt. 
 The forwarding process is governed by a policy qi ∈ [0,1] 
which together with the forwarding factor pf determines the 
probability that each member i is chosen as a forwarder. 
 Results:
 Analyse the impact of such probabilistic behaviour of principals.
 Establish necessary and sufﬁcient criteria for choosing an 
appropriate forwarding policy to achieve required privacy level.Overview
 Trust in Crowds
 Extend the Crowds protocol to a more realistic scenario:
 Associate to each principal i a probability1- ti ∈ [0,1] to 
become corrupt. 
 The forwarding process is governed by a policy qi ∈ [0,1] 
which together with the forwarding factor pf determines the 
probability that each member i is chosen as a forwarder. 
 Results:
 Analyse the impact of such probabilistic behaviour of principals.
 Establish necessary and sufﬁcient criteria for choosing an 
appropriate forwarding policy to achieve required privacy level.
observe this is at meta-level, a 
parameter of the analysisOverview
 Trust in Crowds
 Extend the Crowds protocol to a more realistic scenario:
 Associate to each principal i a probability1- ti ∈ [0,1] to 
become corrupt. 
 The forwarding process is governed by a policy qi ∈ [0,1] 
which together with the forwarding factor pf determines the 
probability that each member i is chosen as a forwarder. 
 Results:
 Analyse the impact of such probabilistic behaviour of principals.
 Establish necessary and sufﬁcient criteria for choosing an 
appropriate forwarding policy to achieve required privacy level.
observe this is at meta-level, a 
parameter of the analysis
Can be established experimentally, eg 
by the “blender” using Bayesian method, 
eg the Beta trust modeltCrowds
The extended protocol
tCrowds [here and now]: allows users anonymous web 
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extension to the general 
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at position k prob to pick a 



































































observe this is 0 
iff  T=1 and ti=1






































Observe that if i is detectable, this quantity is positive: ie, it can always 
be caught when is the initiator: Crowds never achieves “absolute privacy”
P(ai | oi) =
P(ai,oi)
P(oi)
P(ai | oi) =
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also observe that when T = 1- c/n and S = n - c, 
which characterise the (standard) Crowds, then 
this formula simpliﬁes to the standard one.Provably exposed principals
19
Proposition: (Provably Exposed Principals)
For all users s.t.             , we have
iff one of the following holds. 
p(oi)≠0 p(ai | oi)=1
1. pf = 0
2. ti = 0
3. qi = 0
4. T = 1
5. S = tiProvably exposed principals
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all but i are 
corrupt!On Forwarding
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Theorem: (Monotonicity in forwarding)
              is a decreasing function of pf
Corollary: (Anonymity range)
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tells us that high 
values of pf enhance 
privacy. Yet, they slow 
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j￿i qjtj + qiti
￿n
j￿i tj
tells us that high 
values of pf enhance 
privacy. Yet, they slow 
the protocol down
tells us that pf =1 
minimises p(ai | oi). 
But then the message 
never reaches...On Trust Values
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Theorem: (α-Probable Innocence)
For all α∈ [0,1], the extended protocol 
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For all α∈ [0,1], the extended protocol 








j￿i qjtj + qiti
￿n
j￿i tj
≥ 1 − α
observe that this 
provides a system 
of linear inequalities 
that can be solved 
in qi to try and 
achieve α-probable 
innocence“Social” & “Rational” Policies
22
Achieving α-Probable Innocence
Maintain the lower bound on p(ai | oi)=1 below α by manipulating 
the forwarding distribution (social policy), or by excluding 
untrustworthy participants (rational policy).
Example: Suppose
For α=1/2 the system admits two solutions, eg
Observe how user 1 is helped (at the others’ risk!) to offset its higher 
tendency to corruption. Indeed, probable innocence in (standard) Crowds 
cannot be achieved.
The alternative, is for 2 and 3 to exclude 1 and yield higher overall security.
q1 = 0.4575, q2 = 0.2620, q3 = 0.2805 .
t1 = 0.70, t2 = 0.97, t3 = 0.99Conclusion & Further Work
We have extended Crowds to take into account that principals are not 
usually either honest or malicious, but are liable to become corrupt (and 
again uncorrupt). Ours is the ﬁrst attempt to cope with such 
probabilistic behaviour.
Our forwarding policies can be used to make the protocol more secure 
(either socially or rationally) once an estimation of trust is available. A lot 
more work on integrating trust estimation is to be done.
A deeper analysis of trust is likely to be possible on advanced anonymity 
protocols such as Tarzan and ToR.
We are in the process of complete this analysis by dropping the 
hypothesis of short transactions.
23Related Work
Crowds & External knowledge
 Real world: attackers usually gather additional information 
correlated to the anonymous agents before attacking the 
protocol.
 Example: two agents voting by “yes” or “no” and the result of 
the vote is {yes, no}
 Agents used different colours but the adversary does not 
know the correlation between the colors and the agents: 
{yes, no} ≡ {yes, no} 
 The adversary knows the correlation: {yes, no} ≠ {yes, no}Related Work
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analysis of the impact of attackers’ 
extra knowledge on the security of 
information hiding protocols.Related Work
Crowds & Beliefs & Vulnerability
Open problem: measure and account for the accuracy of the 
adversary extra knowledge.
Integrate the notion of adversary’s beliefs:
 Assume both actual a priori distribution of the hidden input and 
its correlation to the extra information unknown to adversary.
 Generalise the approach to information ﬂow systems.
Results:
 New metric for quantitative information ﬂow based on the 
concept of vulnerability that takes into account the adversary's 
beliefs.
 Model allows to identify the levels of accuracy for the adversary's 
beliefs which are compatible with the security of a given program 
or protocol.Related Work
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